

# The Politics of Space in Punjab's Canal Colonies

HASSAN JAVID

## INTRODUCTION

The May 2013 general elections held in Pakistan were heralded as an epochal moment in the country's long transition to democracy. For the first time ever, an elected government had managed to complete its tenure and oversee a peaceful transfer of power to a rival political party following polls that were widely seen as being free and fair. These elections served to consolidate the process of democratization that had been initiated by the collapse of the Musharraf regime in 2007, and gave credence to the notion that Pakistan might finally be able to move beyond its history of authoritarian rule. It was a welcome and perhaps unexpected development in a country that had once been characterized as the harbinger of a 'reverse wave' that would potentially see the unravelling of nascent democratic regimes across the world (Diamond, 2000).

However, amidst the optimism that greeted the 2013 elections, several important questions remain about the extent to which Pakistan has been able to move towards a more substantive form of democracy. For one, there is considerable reason to believe that the country's military establishment continues to exercise a tremendous amount of de facto power, particularly in the areas of foreign policy and internal security (Haqqani, 2016; Husain, 2016). In a context where widespread, if unsubstantiated, allegations persist regarding the military's role in fomenting movements and supporting political parties that have weakened Pakistan's democratic governments since 2008, the fear of yet another military coup remains ever-present.

Less remarked is the fact that, for all the progress that has been made, Pakistan's democratic politics remains marked by a tremendous amount of elite dominance, with traditional politicians drawn from the country's propertied classes continuing to exert a disproportionate amount of influence on politics. Indeed, according to one recent study, national and provincial level elections held in Punjab since 1970 have largely been contested between members of just 400 dynastic families (Cheema et al., 2013). Some explanations for the persistence of elite power in Pakistan, during periods of both civilian and military rule, have often

focused on the country's class structure and its implications for state-citizen relations (Alavi, 1972; Rehman, 2012), the ability of successful elite politicians to control vote banks built around the provision of patronage (Martin, 2014; Mohmand, 2014), and the enduring influence of colonial-era institutions, inherited by Pakistan in 1947, that were designed to facilitate elite capture of the state (Javid, 2011; 2015). Barring structural reform aimed at reshaping Pakistan's economic system and overhauling its institutions, it is reasonable to suggest that the process of democratization in Pakistan is unlikely to dilute the power of elites that have been able to deeply entrench themselves within the country's political framework.

Building on existing arguments advanced to explain the persistence of elite power in Pakistan, this paper seeks to delve further into explaining the on-going impact of colonial-era interventions on contemporary Pakistani politics. In particular, the paper focuses on the method by which 'canal colonies' were created and settled in Punjab, emphasizing how the spatial organization of these sites, informed by British economic and political imperatives, served to produce a set of social relations that would subsequently facilitate the power of elites aligned with the colonial project. By highlighting the case of the canal colonies, the paper attempts to shed further light on the precise, local-level mechanisms that have historically allowed elites to reproduce and perpetuate their political power.

Between 1885 and 1926, the British government in Punjab embarked upon an ambitious programme of agricultural expansion, establishing nine new 'canal colonies' between the five western rivers of the province. The principal aim of this project was to bring under cultivation millions of acres of land that had previously been barren and only sparsely inhabited, and this was all made possible through the extensive development of Punjab's irrigation network, and by transferring a large body of settlers from the eastern part of the province to this new western frontier. Amidst rising revenues and production the British often looked to Punjab and the canal colonies in particular, as an example of how the correct balance of institutional design, administrative acumen and social management could make manifest the benefits of colonial rule in India. Indeed, in the words of at least one contemporary observer, 'the administration has introduced improvements of great magnitude, resulting in marked and rapid increase of wealth to the people who, to this extent, have been relieved of the pressure of their former poverty' (Calvert, 1922: 68).

Despite colonial claims to the contrary, however, the canal colonies in Punjab were not marked by widespread prosperity and contentment. Designed and implemented in a way that reflected the colonial quest for order and economic accumulation in the province, the canal colonies project was marked by the reproduction and entrenchment of an agrarian

order that privileged the interests of the colonial state and its allies within the Punjabi landed classes. As will be shown in this paper, colonial policy with regards to the allocation of space in the canal colonies played a tremendous role in shaping social interaction between different classes and groups in the newly-established villages, establishing relations of domination, control and economic production shaped by the priorities of the colonial state. In particular, the spatial design of the new villages themselves, coupled with the criteria used by the colonial state to select settlers for the colonies, reflected the impact of official policy on ordering these new spaces along particular social, political and economic lines. This, in turn, structured social relations between the colonists and informed their interaction within these spaces, allowing landholders to use the space allocated to them in the canal colonies to enhance their ability to negotiate with the colonial state while simultaneously increasing the social subordination of the artisanal and landless classes.

While Ali's (1988) seminal account of canal colonization in Punjab provides a comprehensive overview of the economic priorities and administrative patterns that underpinned the creation of these new settlements, this paper seeks to bring greater analytical focus to bear on the question of how the demarcation of space in the canal colony villages fed into strategies of elite empowerment. The conceptualization of space that is employed in this paper is informed by the work of Henri Lefebvre (1991; 2009a; 2009b), recognizing that rather than being an empty container within which social interactions take place, 'space is at once a precondition and a result of social superstructures' (Lefebvre, 1991: 85). While the logic of scientific planning and engineering may imbue the ordering of space with a sense of apolitical neutrality, space is nonetheless constituted by extant strategies and ideologies and is reflective of particular relationships of power, control and regulation (Lefebvre, 2009a). Once produced within this context, space itself can play a key role in structuring economic accumulation, social interaction, and political practice, creating centres occupied by dominant groups and classes, and margins to which are relegated the dispossessed and disempowered. Space and the social interact symbiotically, producing and reproducing a relationship that perpetuates modes of domination and power while simultaneously opening up avenues for entrenchment and, possibly, resistance.

The existence of this 'socio-spatial dialectic' thus implies that, 'the spatial organization of human society is an evolving product of human action, a form of social construction arising within the physical frame of ubiquitous, contextual space but clearly distinguishable from it' (Soja, 1980: 210). However, in order to better understand the way in which this process evolves, it is necessary to relate the creation of space not only to the dominant forms of economic, political and social production, but also

the institutions that govern these areas of interaction. For Lefebvre (2009a), the constitution of space within a particular mode of production or regime of accumulation necessarily entails a process of homogenization, through which space is made familiar and governable through uniform sets of rules and practices, fragmentation, through which space is divided into distinct and discrete fractions (both real and imagined) that perform particular functions, and hierarchization, leading to the allocation of space according to its use and its value to different classes or groups. The state plays a necessary role in linking these processes together, allowing for the creation of a unitary 'social space' that, for all its internal contradictions, tensions, and divisions, can nonetheless be conceptualized as a whole within a given context (Lefebvre, 2009c). The regulatory regime of institutions that emerges to provide a framework of rules for this social space is thus intrinsically linked to the application of state power, and is therefore shaped in accordance with the interests of actors within the state and their allies within society. This is of particular importance in the case of Punjab's canal colonies, where the colonial state actively intervened in the ordering and regulation of space in order to ensure the pursuit of its own interests and those of the landed classes aligned with it. Over time, the institutional framework put in place by the colonial state to control these 'new' spaces, as embodied in legislation and formal, institutionalized rules of governance, remained fundamental to the structuring of social relations in the colonies.

Working within a Lefebvrian framework, Kerr (2007) has argued that the colonial state used its technological tools (particularly roads and railways) to produce, and impose, a space in Punjab that reduced the agency of the colonized, limiting the extent to which they could exercise power and authority relative to the colonizers. The canal colonies project, while embodying a similar logic of control and domination, reflected a different approach; in contrast with the railways, roads, and other means of communication that were manipulated by the colonial state to regulate flows of capital and labour that constantly circulated around the province, the canal colonies project was concerned with creating fixity rather than managing fluidity. As envisaged by colonial planners, the canal colonies project sought not only to create organized spaces for economic production, but also aimed to fix in perpetuity that specific set of agrarian social relations that the British felt was most conducive to strengthening the hold of the colonial state in Punjab. Inasmuch as the production and regulation of space was required to ensure the maintenance of order and the accumulation of surplus, the twin imperatives of managing fluidity and imposing fixity were intrinsically linked, informing the institutional basis of colonial rule in Punjab while simultaneously shaping production and social relations in the province.

This paper is divided into four sections. The first focuses on the spatial

dimension of canal colonization, examining the design of the settlements themselves as well as the regulatory regime that was put in place by the colonial state to maximize production and the maintenance of order. The second section looks at how space was appropriated by the state and its landed allies for economic accumulation, and the third section explores how this had a corresponding effect on political participation and practice. The final section concludes the article, summarizing the argument presented and linking it back to the question of elite persistence in contemporary Pakistani politics.

### THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE

Upon annexing Punjab in 1849, the first task confronted by the British was the creation of an administrative and revenue system that would meet the twin imperatives of ensuring both order and accumulation. Amidst sometimes acrimonious and often exhaustive debates that relied heavily on colonial anthropology and experience in other parts of India, the framework for rule that eventually emerged in Punjab by the 1870s was one built upon an alliance of the state with peasant proprietors cultivating their own land, and a landed elite drawn from the remnants of the Sikh and Mughal aristocracies, as well as local chiefs who had supported British efforts in the Revolt of 1857 (Metcalf, 1962; Hambly, 1964; Penner, 1986; Nelson, 2011; Javid, 2011). This alliance was institutionalized by the granting property rights to these social actors, and by giving them preferential access to the colonial state through the passage of laws and orders that recognized their privileged status. By providing patronage to peasant proprietors, who formed the backbone of the agrarian economy, the colonial state was able to ensure the continued production of revenue and agricultural surplus by a relatively prosperous peasantry whose well-being was clearly tied to that of the state. In the aristocracy and rich peasantry, who constituted the landed elite, the colonial state was able to find allies who, by virtue of their social, political, and economic strength, could mobilize active political support in favour of the government and inhibit the spread of the types of instability that could threaten the political order. While peasant proprietors were characterized by their 'passive' loyalty to the state, it was believed that the richer and more powerful elements of the rural hierarchy could prove to be more useful in actively building and maintaining support for the colonial regime (Van den Dungen, 1972: 100-5).


In this context, the canal colonies project was initiated for a number of reasons; the creation of these new settlements would provide employment to potentially restive Sikh soldiers following the end of the Anglo-Sikh Wars (Gilmartin, 1994: 1132), investment in irrigation and infrastructure represented a chance to revitalize an agrarian economy characterized

by declining revenues (Babar, 2001: 50), and the scheme also represented a means through which to relieve strong demographic pressures in the eastern part of the province.<sup>1</sup>

The problem of rendering habitable and cultivable millions of acres of barren, inhospitable land was one that, on the surface, required technical solutions rooted in the scientific knowledge and engineering expertise available to the colonial state. Placed under the charge of the Public Works Department, the creation of the canal colonies began with the construction of the canals that would be used to irrigate this new agricultural frontier. Moving systematically across the plains of central and north-western Punjab, the colonial state employed a veritable army of surveyors, engineers, experts, and workers to undertake what was, for all intents and purposes, the largest project of its kind in India. While the task of expanding Punjab's irrigation network was one that had been tentatively begun in the decade following the annexation of the province, the years leading up to the establishment of the first canal colonies saw an acceleration in this process, culminating ultimately in the creation of a network of irrigation that, by 1947, spread over 14,000,000 acres of land and also incorporated a dense web of roads and towns that linked the different parts of western Punjab together. As argued by Ali (1988: 9) the extent of the canal network, coupled with the tremendous dependence of agriculture on canal water in the absence of reliable rainfall, resulted in the creation of a 'hydraulic' society in which the colonial state, through its control over water, exercised a tremendous amount of power over those who lived in the region.


The canal colonies also embodied the colonial state's belief in the capacity for carefully designed environments and institutions to shape human interaction (Glover, 2005: 552). Concerned as it was with efficient extraction and administration, the colonial state actively brought its scientific knowledge and expertise to bear on the question of designing the ideal spaces within which migrants to the canal colonies would reside and work. The result was the creation of standardized, homogenized typologies for settlement that were replicated in all of the colony schemes. Indeed, the construction of village settlement according to fixed, replicable plans was a stated aim of the colonial state simply because of the way in which it simplified the work of producing these new spaces.<sup>2</sup> However, part of the logic behind developing these plans was also to ensure that the spaces thus produced could be allocated in line with the economic and social objectives of the colonial state, facilitating orderly accumulation while simultaneously reshaping the way in which residents of these villages interacted with their environments and the institutions that governed them. This was in sharp contrast with existing villages in Punjab, whose organic growth had led to the growth of spatial arrangements that diverged widely from those idealized by the British. This difference is shown in Figures 1 and 2.

FIG. 1. MAP OF CHAK No. 73 GB, A CANAL COLONY VILLAGE



Source: R. Singh, 1932, 'Punjab Village Surveys no. 4: An Economic Survey of Kala Gaddi Thamman (Chak 73 G.B.), a Village in the Lyallpur District of the Punjab', Board of Economic Inquiry, Government of Punjab.

FIG. 2. MAP OF BHAMBU SANDILA, A NON-CANAL COLONY VILLAGE



Source: A.R. Khan, 1935 'Punjab Village Surveys no. 8: An Economic Survey of Bhambu Sandila, a Village in the Muzaffargarh District of the Punjab', Board of Economic Inquiry, Government of Punjab.



What is most immediately striking about the comparison between the two villages is the way in which space is divided and demarcated. The map of Chak No. 73 is defined by straight lines and orderly sites, with clearly demarcated squares of land for cultivation, areas for settlements, and spaces for community interaction. This was in contrast with Bhambu Sandila, a village where settlements were scattered across fragmented landholdings in a space characterized by organized chaos at best. The contrast is particularly relevant when taking into account the implications of the difference between organic and artificial settlement; whereas land ownership and settlement in Bhambu Sandila were reflective of decades of exchange, contestation, and appropriation between the different families living within the village, the spaces available inside Chak No. 73 were designed to be carefully allocated to different colonists transplanted into the village from other parts of Punjab.

In a sense, the plans drawn up for the canal colony villages were reflective of the problems that the British had experienced with already existing settlements. Having spent decades sorting through often complex relationships of land ownership and tenancy, the simple geometrical logic of the new settlements was, for the British, one of the keys to administrative efficiency (Ali, 1988: 159-60). By clearly delineating boundaries of possession and residence, the British hoped to be able to regulate more effectively the types of conflicts over ownership that had characterized earlier attempts at specifying property rights in Punjab. Allocating land in this fashion also ensured that squares set aside for cultivation would remain viable economic units. In an atmosphere where an increasing emphasis was placed upon greater bureaucratic efficiency within the colonial state as part of a broader attempt at reducing the costs associated with governance (Stokes, 1980), the capacity to easily assess and collect taxes, as well as resolve disputes, was of tremendous importance to the British. Not coincidentally, therefore, the design of the canal colony villages exemplified the way in which the power of the colonial state was, 'tied to a legal structure in which the definition of property rights in land was central' (Gilmartin, 1994: 1133).

Having created the physical spaces of the canal colonies, the colonial state was faced with the issue of populating them. Here too the state relied upon the idiom of science to justify the decisions it took with regards to the type of occupants it sought for the new colonies. Drawing upon their knowledge of Punjab's social structure, as well as administrative and political precedent, the British pursued a policy of settlement in which agricultural land was predominantly awarded only to members of 'agriculturalist tribes' from eastern Punjab. These particular *biraderis* were those that had historically possessed and cultivated land in Punjab, and the large landholders and peasant proprietors who belonged to these *biraderis* had hitherto been the colonial state's main indigenous allies in


Punjab. While colonial anthropology provided a ready social scientific justification for the categorization of Punjab's population in these terms (Babar, 2001: 46) the identification of the agriculturalist *biraderis* as the segment of the population most suited to the cultivation of the new agrarian frontier was simply part of the colonial state's broader political imperatives. Allowing Punjab's historically landed classes to appropriate the new spaces of production in the canal colonies was a means through which to ensure the maintenance and stability of a colonial order premised upon the continued cooptation of these elements of the rural hierarchy, and also allowed for the incorporation of the newly-settled areas within the extant administrative framework of colonial rule.

The exact manner in which the canal colonies were settled provides further insights into this process. Rather than selecting individuals from disparate parts of Punjab to move into the canal colonies, care was taken by the colonial state to ensure that entire communities were relocated to the new villages. What this meant in practice was that in addition to the dominant *biraderi* groups that would be granted land in the canal colonies, artisans and landless workers would also be transplanted into these new settlements. From the perspective of the colonial administrators in Punjab, heavily influenced by the work of Henry Maine, this made sense because it allowed for the retention of the traditional social structures and ties that formed the basis for Customary Law in Punjab (Dewey, 1991). Engineering the shift to the canal colonies with minimal social disruption was of obvious importance to the colonial state, and encouraging settlement in this manner was one of the ways in which dislocation was limited. In practice, however, what this meant was that even though the new villages ostensibly represented spaces within which 'new' communities were to be formed, the selective distribution of land and the implementation of the colonial state's vision of Customary Law ensured the perpetuation of an agrarian order in which the landless remained subordinate to traditional landed elites (Ali, 1988: 192; Gilmartin, 2004).

As can be seen from Figures 3 and 4, the plans drawn up for the actual settlement sites within the canal colony villages exemplified the kind of geometrical fixity that exemplified the colonial quest to produce predictable and measurable outcomes in the spheres of economic production and social interaction. By drawing up settlement schema of this sort, in the shape of grids and maps, the colonial state engaged in a Lefebvrian process of homogenization, bringing to bear upon the spaces that were being created a particular logic of administration and control that conferred a unity upon these geographically diverse sites, making it possible for them to be absorbed within the common institutional framework of colonial rule. In addition to conforming to fixed notions of what the 'ideal' settlement would look like, particularly from the


perspectives of economic production, revenue collection, and sanitation, these village plans had the added benefit of being easily replicable. Like the criteria used by the colonial state to populate the canal colonies, with grantees of land being selected from fixed categories on the basis of criteria concretized and institutionalized by the state, the plans provided a clearly defined set of rules for settlement that remained largely unchanged across time and space. The abstract principles of fixity and homogeneity embodied in these plans constituted an effective means through which to counter the unpredictability and irregularity of social life.

FIG. 3. PLAN FOR A VILLAGE SITE IN THE CHENAB COLONY



Source: Government of Punjab, Proceedings of the Punjab Revenue and Agriculture Department, April 1900, Ref #4.

FIG. 4. ALTERNATIVE PLAN FOR A VILLAGE SITE IN THE CHENAB COLONY



Source: Gazetteer of the Chenab Colony, 1904, as reproduced in Glover, 2005.

One important way in which the new villages differed from the old was in the creation of new spatial hierarchies within the canal colonies (Glover, 2005: 553). As illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, the plans of the canal colony villages created a clear distinction between the spaces that were available for the privileged cultivating classes and those that were designated for the landless, and hence politically marginal, elements of the village population. The grantees of colony agricultural land were expected to reside in the centre of the colony villages, with smaller dwellings at the edges being reserved for 'menials', the term used by the colonial state to describe the landless artisans and wage labourers who often accompanied peasant grantees into the new canal colony villages. Given that the edges of the villages were generally thought to be unsafe and susceptible to criminal activity, and combined with the fact that manure and water tanks were often kept close to these areas, the relegation of the landless to these parts of the villages was part of a policy that sought to ensure maximal comfort for the grantees of agricultural land.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, the invisible barrier that separated the spaces occupied by the landed

and the landless was even justified in terms of sanitation, with one colonial official decrying the, 'somewhat too intimate proximity of the menials to the *abadkars*' for precisely this reason.<sup>4</sup>

In contrast with the scattered settlement pattern of the Bhambu Sandila shown above in Figure 2, the villages created in the canal colonies spatially concretized the social hierarchy in Punjab, fixing not only the economic position of the subordinate classes, but their geographical position as well. The physical marginalization of the landless was reflected in descriptions of material progress within these villages, published as part of the annual canal colony reports, with colonial officials focusing almost entirely on politically and economically important landed cultivators while almost completely excluding other social groups. Quite literally, in the official colonial lexicon as well as in physical space, the landless in the canal colonies were shifted to the margins of village life.

This process of marginalizing those not relevant to colonial objectives was one that also applied to the indigenous inhabitants of the areas in which the canal colonies were established. Sparsely populated as they may have been, the areas selected for canal colonization were nonetheless home to a number of pastoralist tribes that, particularly in the early stages of colonization, were quickly categorized by the colonial state as being incapable of engaging in the sort of agricultural production that was planned for the new colonies. In the words of Captain Popham Young, colonization officer for the Chenab colony,

It is now an axiom of successful colonisation that the *Bār* tribes should be separated from incoming settlers. . . . The *Bār* tribes will inevitably graze down their crops and steal their cattle as they did in the old days when settlers were first introduced on to the Jhang Branch. They will, moreover, form a noisy and malcontent escort to the colonisation officer wherever he goes.<sup>5</sup>

The colonial view of these tribes as being criminal and inefficient was undoubtedly also informed by clear economic concerns. As argued in the Punjab Legislative Council's debate on the Sind-Sagar Doab Colonisation Bill, scattered pastoral agriculture simply had no place within a scheme that sought to transform the physical space of cultivation through canal irrigation while simultaneously encouraging the production of more profitable crops. C.L. Tupper, commenting on the rights of the pastoralists to the land, succinctly stated the official colonial position by saying that,

The great physical change which the canal will bring upon the face of the country will put it out of the power of our successors 20 years hence to give the graziers and the melon-cultivators the exact equivalent of what they have now. In the area retained by Government their rights will be extinguished.<sup>6</sup>

Consequently, the approach taken by the colonial state to dealing with these tribes was varied but, for the most, focused on relocation and resettlement. In instances where the state believed that these tribes could

undertake agriculture of the sort that was envisaged for the canal colonies, arrangements were made to accommodate them within the canal colonies. In other instances, new settlements, both industrial and agrarian, were created within which members of both the pastoralist tribes and designated criminal tribes were subjected to penal labour aimed at reforming them (Ali, 1988: 52-3 and 102). As argued by Major (1999), colonial policy towards these tribes alternated between periods of repression and rehabilitation and even though attempts were finally made in the 1920s to permanently incorporate these tribes within the broader community by granting them greater amounts of land within the colonies, the colonial state's attitude towards these tribes remained one coloured by suspicion, and focused on reducing the possibility of any kind of disruption that could potentially disturb the mechanisms of social interaction and economic production being engineered in the canal colonies.

In addition to creating and allocating space within the canal colonies, the colonial state also played an active role in regulating this space. Given that the colonial state in Punjab had a distinctly paternalist approach to governance, the canal colonies provided it with an opportunity to micro-manage production and society at a scale that had not previously been attempted. Eschewing almost completely the notion that the possession of land provided occupiers with the right to do with it as they pleased, land in the canal colonies was leased out, with the state refusing to grant full proprietary rights to the migrants who settled in the colonies. By retaining ownership of the canal colony lands in its own hands, the state sought to ensure that it could intervene in the production process as it saw fit without having to deal with the rights that would have otherwise been conferred upon the grantees. Towards this end, grants of land in the canal colonies were conditional upon grantees meeting targets and criteria set by the colonial state with regards to agricultural practice. As leases were given out to grantees for limited time periods only, complying with the colonial state's regulations was necessary for the renewal of land grants in the canal colonies. Failure to abide by these rules resulted in a variety of punitive measures, culminating ultimately in the confiscation of land.

While there were some exceptions to this regime of conditional property rights (as discussed below), the colonial government retained an interest in regulating the distribution and use of agricultural land. Part of the reason for this was political. Given that land was the basis of the agrarian order in Punjab, with British power dependent on the continued support of the province's traditionally powerful landowning classes, any changes in Punjab's political economy that had the potential to erode the status quo were strongly resisted. As mounting levels of agrarian debt triggered the sale of land from rural landowners to predominantly urban moneylenders

(Nazir, 2000), the colonial state undertook a series of legislative interventions aimed at restricting the sale and transfer of agricultural land. This culminated with the introduction of the Land Alienation Act of 1900, a piece of legislation that effectively eliminated the free market for land in Punjab by restricting the ownership of agricultural land to members of designated agriculturalist tribes (Barrier, 1966).

In the canal colonies, the logic of agrarian paternalism exhibited by the colonial state existed in an amplified form. In addition to providing protection from the predations of creditors, the colonial state sought to play an active role in the production process itself. Towards this end, the regulations put in place in the colonies covered a wide range of areas, including the planting of trees, the maintenance of roads and waterways, the digging of wells, and even the storage of manure in designated areas.<sup>7</sup> In a different vein, as part of the colonial state's preoccupation with reforming the character of the colonists, efforts were also made to regulate sanitation, with large grants being placed at the disposal of the settlers to initiate and maintain sanitation schemes that, it was believed, would improve the environment of the villages. Most important of all, however, were the regulations governing the inheritance of land and the succession of leases. In the interests of preventing the subdivision and fragmentation of holdings, a possibility that could lead to economic inefficiency, stringent checks were placed on the transfer of land to heirs and relatives (Ali, 1988: 65-66). Paradoxically, the very same regime of property rights that allowed the landed classes to appropriate space for themselves was, under the spatial arrangement governing the canal colonies, a means through which the colonial state could exercise control over these actors.

### SPACES OF PRODUCTION

When the canal colonies were being set up, changes had begun to take place in the economic structure of Punjab that would have an impact on economic life in the new settlements. In the last few decades of the nineteenth century, Punjab found itself being increasingly incorporated within international circuits of capital. Cash cropping and relatively input-intensive cultivation for the market had begun to replace traditional production patterns in earnest, generating the type of stratification between the richer and poorer peasants that was associated with capitalist agriculture (Mishra, 1982). Inequality in landownership was exacerbated by increases in population that were not, until the establishment of the canal colonies, matched by a concurrent expansion in the amount of cultivated land in Punjab. To the extent that growth took place, it was triggered by sustained increases in food prices amidst relatively static levels of taxation, with much of this growth remaining concentrated in the hands of the rich landholders (Hamid, 1982). As a result, greater

economic output and escalating competition for access to increasingly scarce agricultural land saw land become transformed into a commodity of considerable value, a development that would also slowly begin to emerge in the canal colonies. Even as the landless and poorer sections of the peasantry were increasingly forced into wage labour, and as proprietors with small holdings were squeezed into the ranks of the landless, the dominant fractions of the landholding class in Punjab were able to consolidate and expand their holdings by using their resources to acquire more land. In the long run, as argued by Ali (1987) and Mukherjee (2005), the trajectory of economic development in the canal colonies would lead to the creation of a political economy in which ecological distortions combined with inequality, corruption and rent-seeking would lead to rising economic inefficiency and productivity, if not declining economic growth. Indeed, the myth of prosperity that informed the colonial discourse on Punjab was one that focused almost exclusively on the province's landed peasantry while ignoring the deeper contradictions accompanying the transition to capitalist agriculture.

Nonetheless, the British continually pointed to the example of the canal colonies to make its case for Punjabi exceptionalism, arguing that the constant economic returns and rising levels of prosperity in the province were evidence of the success of the colonization project. A measure of the extent to which the colonies proved to be lucrative for the state can be seen in the way in which, by 1913, the state's revenue demand from canal-irrigated lands stood at Rs. 93,83,797, the vast majority of which was derived from the canal colonies.<sup>8</sup> By 1928, after the major colonization projects had been completed, and on the eve of the Great Depression and its subsequent impact on Punjab, the revenue demand from canal-irrigated land was Rs. 1,82,11,230.<sup>9</sup> This tremendous rise in revenue was partly due to the expansion in the amount of canal-irrigated land in this period, but was also reflective both of the rising prices for agricultural produce, as well as the increasing value of land. The profit the state derived from revenue was supplemented by other sources of income as well, most notably by charging for the use of canal water. Given the tremendous size of the initial capital investment required to construct the canal network, the rate at which the British saw a return on their investment varied and some colonies proved to be more successful than others but by and large the overall picture was one of increasing profits over time. The scale of the wealth being generated in the colonies can be understood by considering how, in 1917, colonial officials noted that, 'the crops raised on the canals probably represented one-half of the agricultural wealth of the province, and it may be said that in 1916-1917 the canals again stood between the Province and severe scarcity'.<sup>10</sup> By the end of British rule in Punjab, taking into account all investment and expenses,



Ali (1988: 168) estimates that the canal colonies provided the colonial state with almost Rs. 1 billion in total profit.

In the context of the tremendous amount of wealth being produced in the canal colonies, it needs to be understood that for the most, accumulation and appropriation were processes dominated by the state and its landed allies. Rather than benefitting the various different strata in rural society, prosperity remained the preserve of the richer peasant proprietors and large landlords, with the landless, the artisans, and the tenants-at-will continually being squeezed. For both the state and the grantees that possessed land, the ability to manipulate and regulate space was of crucial importance to this process of surplus extraction, and the spatial arrangements put in place at the time of the creation of the canal colonies were fundamental in facilitating and reinforcing this process. By retaining the ability to control access to land, water, and other resources, the state and many of the landowning colonists were able to bolster their capacity to extract rents from those who were subordinate to them in the economic hierarchy.

The economic interests of the colonial state in the canal colonies were twofold. In addition to an interest in profit through the receipt of revenue, the state also sought to use the canal colonies as a means through which to introduce new patterns of agricultural production in Punjab. Towards this end, different categories of land grants were established in the colonies in addition to the standardized squares of land that were awarded to the bulk of the cultivating peasantry. These included grants for serving and retired military personnel and members of the civilian administration, horse and camel breeding grants aimed at raising animals for use by the British military, and capitalist 'yeoman' grants that, being larger than regular peasant grants, were intended to promote enterprising farmers and rich peasants who could invest in intensive agriculture. Provisions were also made to make land available for loyal members of Punjab's landed aristocracy in return for their continued support of the government, allowing them to enhance not only their economic power, but also their political and social standing. As such, concurrent with the process of homogenization that underpinned canal colony settlement and design, the state also engaged in a complex process of fragmentation and hierarchization, in the Lefebvrian sense of the terms, bringing together different spaces devoted to a variety of different economic functions and controlled by a different categories of actors, all of which were underpinned by a common institutional framework of law and regulation.

The preferential treatment accorded to the landed classes in the canal colonies, and the control they were given over land in the villages, proved to be instrumental in allowing this section of the populace to pursue its own economic interests effectively. In addition to the prosperity that was

engendered through agricultural production, grantees of land in the canal colonies also profited tremendously from the sale of both occupancy rights and property itself. Under certain conditions, particularly after 1907, grantees in the canal colonies could acquire proprietary rights to their land through purchase and short of this, at least had the right to sell their occupancy rights to other qualifying elements of the rural populace. While the sale of proprietary rights to eligible colonists was itself profitable for the state, it was an even greater source of revenue for the grantees themselves. Due to its high level of productivity, canal colony land, for the most, tended to be higher in value than land in the rest of the province. In 1921, for example, an acre of land in the Shahpur district of the Lower Jhelum Colony sold for Rs. 599,<sup>11</sup> as compared with an average price of Rs. 345 per acre for the province as a whole.<sup>12</sup> Even horse-breeding grants, which were generally considered to be less desirable due to the strict conditionalities attached to them by the state, had a value of Rs. 396 per acre in the same year. Indeed, for some grantees it was more profitable to sell their canal colony land and purchase land for cultivation in their villages of origin instead.

Alongside the benefit that accrued to landowners through the sale of both agricultural produce and land, the very nature of the spatial arrangement under which the canal colonies had been settled facilitated extraction and accumulation through alternative means. The canal colonies were often plagued by corruption at the local level, with powerful local landlords and government officials using their authority to receive a variety of different rents from those subordinate to them. One of the most widespread practices of this nature was the way in which access to irrigation water was controlled and regulated by these actors. While dues were paid to the state for the use of canal water, the system of *warabandi* that was instituted in the colonies to regulate the usage of this water was one that relied heavily upon the use of local expertise and authority (Gilmartin, 1994). In the interests of maximising efficiency, the colonial government sought to integrate indigenous practices into the production process, much as Customary Law had been absorbed into the framework of colonial administration. In practice, however, placing the levers of irrigation in the hands of influential local landlords provided them with the means through which to extract rents from their fellow cultivators and tenants, thereby maximizing their own economic gain. In determining who could or could not receive water, and at what cost, the more powerful elements of the landed class were able to regulate the way in which space was used for production in a manner that was similar to the interventions often staged by the colonial state.

The ability of the landed class to manipulate space in the pursuit of profit was also made manifest by the way in which they were provided with the opportunity to lock the landless classes into ties of even greater dependence and subordination. In contrast with the peasant grantees,

whose homestead land was included in the terms under which agricultural land was awarded, the landless in the canal colonies had to continually pay rents to the state in exchange for the right to live in the spaces provided to them by the colonial state. Moreover, colonial officials often consulted the dominant landlords within the villages when it came to the allocation of residential land to the landless and were thus placed in a position where they could wield tremendous influence over the subordinate elements of the village hierarchy.<sup>13</sup> While plans for the villages in the canal colonies provided for separate spaces within which the landless could reside, many of the artisans, wage labourers and hereditary servants who migrated to these villages ended up living in the compounds of the landed families to whom they were attached. In such situations, the colonial state allowed for the grantees to charge rents from the landless occupants of their homestead land,<sup>14</sup> effectively ensuring that the economic power of this class was reinforced by a capacity to control the very spaces within which the landless existed.

The socio-spatial arrangement of the canal colonies functioned at two different economic levels. By design, the spatial dispensation was one that allowed the state to play a decisive role in ordering economic production and social life, providing it with the institutional capacity to intervene in the allocation and use of irrigation water, as well as agricultural and residential land. At the local level, the preferential position accorded to peasant grantees within the canal colonies allowed them appropriate not just the space for economic production, but also the means through which to regulate and control the spaces of the subordinate classes. The configuration of local power in the canal colonies emerged as a result of the spatial arrangement imposed by the colonial state, and thus came to be linked to the economic power of the dominant fractions of the landed class as well as their capacity to directly manipulate and control space to pursue their own interests.

### POLITICS AND PARTICIPATION IN THE CANAL COLONIES

As the canal colonies were settled, the British in Punjab has begun to move towards creating a bureaucracy that was increasingly reliant upon the participation of individuals drawn from the landed classes. The perceived benefits of pursuing this strategy were obvious; co-opting locals as members of the bureaucracy reduced the administrative pressures faced by the British, and drawing these officials from the ranks of the landed elite ensured their loyalty and cooperation. The extent to which this was a pillar of British policy in Punjab can be gauged from how, even at the lowest tier of the revenue administration, staffed entirely by locals, a third of all members belonged to agriculturalist *biraderis*.<sup>15</sup>

In addition to expanding the role of the landed classes in the formal bureaucracy, institutional changes were also adopted that empowered prominent peasant proprietors and clan leaders at the local level. Under the *zaildari* system, derived from the Sikh revenue administration, villages were grouped into territorial units called *zails*, with the geographical area covered by each *zail* being as congruent as possible to the settlement pattern of an identifiable agricultural *biraderi* resident in the area. Each *zail* was administered by a *zaildar* who was selected by the government from amongst the leading agriculturalist families in the area, and who combined his social position as the head of a *biraderi* with his formal role supervising local village headmen. The headman of any given village, known as the *lumberdar*, would be selected from the dominant agriculturalist *biraderi* in the village, and was given the responsibility of ensuring that all the members of the village proprietary body met their revenue obligations to the state. The offices of *zaildar* and *lumberdar* were mostly hereditary and non-transferable, and by virtue of their position within the colonial administrative framework, individuals who held these positions were in a position to access a tremendous amount of patronage and power, further strengthening their position within the agrarian order. This was further supplemented by the fact that *zaildars* and *lumberdars* received 5 per cent of the revenue generated by the villages under their charge (Trevaskis, 1928; Gilmartin, 1988: 20-3).

From the very outset, the canal colonies were of considerable political importance to the colonial state because of the way in which they were used for a variety of military purposes, such as the recruitment of soldiers for the Indian army, the breeding of horses for the cavalry, and the allotment of land to retiring civilian and military personnel (Ali, 1988: 109-57; Pasha, 1998). Additionally, the active role played by the state in ordering space and regulating economic production saw a concurrent rise in the size and power of its administrative apparatuses. As had been the case in the rest of the province the control of irrigation water, the enforcement of rules governing tenancy, and the implementation of legal codes were all tasks that greatly enhanced both the size and the role of the bureaucracy at the local level (Ali, 1987: 119). Moreover, given that the canal colonies had been settled on the basis of *biraderi*, the new villages lent themselves readily to the implementation of the same system of *zaildari* and *lumberdari* that had been instituted in the rest of the province. Indeed, this system of control was felt to be integral to the effective and orderly functioning of village life, and provisions were made to ensure that persons who were appointed to these posts were given additional grants of land in order to enhance their capacity to exercise authority within their areas of influence.<sup>16</sup> A variation on this theme was the granting of land, as well as position within the administration, to religious leaders who could use their influence in the canal colonies to command the loyalty

of their followers (Talbot, 1980: 83-4). Again, land was allocated to those who it was felt could be employed to bolster the power of the colonial state.

The spatial configuration of the canal colonies also played an important role in the model of limited electoral politics that the colonial state began to introduce towards the end of the nineteenth century. From the very beginning, the institutional design of the colonial electoral system was one that was geared towards ensuring the empowerment of the state's allies. As such, in addition to the implementation of property-based franchise qualifications, the British also set about creating voting constituencies that were congruent with existing *zail* circles. The impact of this on the political system was clear; dominant landlords within each revenue circle were now placed in a position in which they could use their sources of social and economic power to incorporate themselves within the formal apparatuses of the state. In the canal colonies, this effectively meant that the same local leaders who possessed the most economic clout, as well as the closest links to the colonial state, were returned as successful candidates in elections to district boards and, over time, the provincial legislature (Ali, 1988: 108). Again, the allocation of space, and the mechanisms underpinning the dynamics of control over space, played a vital role in structuring power and politics in the canal colonies.

One of the effects of the expansion of the bureaucracy in the canal colonies was an increase in the level of interaction between the residents of the new villages and the formal apparatuses of the state. More often than not, these interactions focused around the activities of the landowning classes who, by virtue of their economic and social relevance to the colonial state, were subjected to a constant regime of surveillance and control. However, as a result of this increased exposure to the machinery of the state, the landowning classes in the canal colonies were able to forge close links to the bureaucracy at the local level, using these ties both for profit and to evade the regulatory gaze of the state. More importantly, landowners were also able to emerge as local level conduits to state power, acting as an interface between the state and the elements of the populace (particularly the landless) who lacked the both the power and means through which to have their voices heard. This formed the template for an emerging system of patron-client politics in Punjab, whereby traditional elites were able to ensure the loyalty and support of their subordinates not just through economic dependency and coercion, but also through the provision of access to the state (Raulet, 1971: 297).

The ability of the landed classes in the canal colonies to capture the limited political space available within the colonial dispensation was undoubtedly the result of institutional legacies that shaped the way in which the colonies themselves were administered. However, it is also the case that without a specific spatial arrangement premised on the

settlement of canal colony villages by *biraderis* transplanted as communities from eastern Punjab, it would not have been possible to replicate the *zaildari* and *lumberdari* systems that existed in the rest of the province. In the canal colonies, settlement patterns were a major factor in determining how political power would be allocated by the colonial state. The appropriation of political space by the landed classes overlapped with their economic and social power, and was reinforced by the socio-spatial logic that regulated life in the canal colonies.

### CONCLUSION: HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

In 1907, resentment directed against the onerous regulatory framework imposed by the colonial state led to the first of several protest movements in the region, with settlers asking for greater freedom and autonomy to use the land they had been granted as they saw fit (Barrier, 1967). The very same institutional structure created by the British, which led to local landed elites being cultivated as privileged allies in the province, also provided these actors with the means through which to make increasing demands of the state. Having built the edifice of colonial control in Punjab upon the co-optation of landowners, the British ultimately had little choice but to acquiesce to the wishes of their indigenous partners.

In addition to illustrating the limits of colonial control, even at the height of Empire in South Asia, these episodes of protest in the canal colonies also underlined a fundamental reality of Punjabi politics; the empowerment of landlords by the state, and their entrenchment within the framework of colonial rule, meant that they were increasingly indispensable when it came to maintaining order in the province through the mobilization of votes, the dispensation of patronage, and countering anti-colonial sentiment. The focal position enjoyed by Punjab's landed elites provided them with leverage to use against the British, and it was precisely these attributes that allowed them to play a pivotal role in facilitating the success of the Muslim League in the 1940s, thereby enabling them to continue exerting disproportionate influence on the politics of post-Independence Pakistan (Talbot, 1988).

In this paper, it has been argued that the logic of spatial arrangement that informed the creation and settlement of the canal colonies played an intrinsic role in shaping interactions between the state and the settlers, as well as between the landed and landless within the new villages. In particular, it has been argued that this spatial logic facilitated the entrenchment and reinforcement of the power of the landed classes, allowing them to virtually monopolize the spaces available for economic production and political participation that was made available under colonial rule. Significantly, the empowerment of local elites in this fashion

essentially planted the roots of the institutionalized system of patron-client politics inherited by Pakistan in 1947 that continues to shape political outcomes in the country. By providing the landed elite with preferential access to the state and its institutions, and by deliberately marginalizing the subordinate classes, the British ensured that their allies would be able to develop and consolidate the sources of economic, bureaucratic, and legislative power that subsequently allowed them to entrench their position and pursue their interests prior to, and after, Partition. The manner in which the canal colonies were designed and settled simply reinforced these tendencies.

As shown by Cheema et al. (2009) on the persistence of landed power in Punjab shows that political power in Punjab continues to be concentrated in the hands of individuals whose ancestors received grants of land from the British, either in the aftermath of the Revolt of 1857 or during the process of canal colony settlement. This is a finding that is made all the more interesting when juxtaposed with the fact that, as shown in Figure 5, the spatial arrangement of canal colony villages in contemporary Punjab, land fragmentation notwithstanding, seems to have changed little in the course of the last 100 years. Also, given how the areas where canal

FIG. 5. MAP OF CHAK NO. 73 GB IN 2016



*Source:* This GPS image of Chak 73 has been obtained by using Google Maps. It is the same village whose original settlement plan is shown in Figure 1.

colonies were created now constitute what Qadeer (2000) has called 'ruralopolizes' with population densities rivalling urban centres around the world, it becomes possible to see how the dynamics of canal colonization, and the enduring institutional effects of British interventions in this area, can be linked to the concentration of political power in relatively few, privileged hands in contemporary Pakistan.

While observers of democratization in Pakistan rightly focus on the country's civil-military balance, those concerned about the quality of Pakistan's nascent democracy must necessarily grapple with the question of how power continues to be concentrated in the hands of a small elite. Examining the interplay between space and everyday social, economic, and political interactions, in the context of a specific historical legacy, can potentially provide insights into the mechanisms that could potentially yield a more participatory and egalitarian democracy in Pakistan.

### NOTES

1. Government of Punjab (GOP), *Memorandum on the Material and Moral Progress of Punjab, 1901-2 to 1911-12*, p. 3.
2. GOP, *Annual Report on the Chenab Colony*, 1904, p. 7.
3. GOP, *Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement*, 1916, p. 10..
4. Ibid.
5. GOP, Proceedings of the Punjab Revenue and Agriculture Department, April 1900, Ref #4, p. 74..
6. GOP, Proceedings of the Council of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Punjab Government Legislative Department, 7th October 1901, p. 4.
7. GOP, *Annual Report on the Chenab Colony*, 1903, pp. 2-4..
8. GOP, Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the Punjab for the Agricultural Year ending 30th September 1913.
9. Ibid., 1928.
10. Ibid., 1917, p. 3.
11. GOP, Report on the Punjab Colonies for the Year ending 30 September 1921, p. 11.
12. GOP, Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the Punjab for the Year ending 30th September, 1921, p. 19.
13. GOP, Report on the Punjab Colonies for the Year ending 30th September 1914, p. 6.
14. GOP, Annual Report on the Lower Chenab Colony, 1914, p. 12.
15. GOP, Report on the Operations of the Department of Land Records and Agriculture, Punjab, 1899-1900, PCSL.

### REFERENCES

- Alavi, H., 1972, 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', in *New Left Review*, no. 72, pp. 59-81.
- Ali, I., 1987, 'Malign Growth? Agricultural Colonization and the Roots of Backwardness in the Punjab', in *Past and Present*, no. 114, pp. 110-32.



- , 1988, *The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885-1947*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ahmed, K., 2016, *Sleepwalking to Surrender: Dealing with Terrorism in Pakistan*, Gurgaon: Viking.
- Babar, Z., 2001, 'Colonizing Agriculture: Scientific Knowledge, Colonial Power, and the Incorporation of India into the Modern World-System', in *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 37-58.
- Banerjee, H., 2005 'Agricultural Labourers in the Punjab (Late Nineteenth Century)', in S. Grewal and S. Pall (eds.), *Pre-colonial and Colonial Punjab: Society Economy, Politics and Culture*, Delhi: Manohar, pp. 307-28.
- Banga, I., 2005 'Urbanization in the Mughal Province of Lahore (c. 1550-1850)', in S. Grewal and S. Pall (eds.), *Five Thousand Years of Urbanization in the Punjab Region*, Delhi: Manohar, pp. 129-44.
- Barrier, Norman G., 1966, 'The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900', *Monograph and Occasional Papers Series*, no. 2, Duke University.
- , 1967, 'The Punjab Disturbances of 1907: The Response of the British Government in India to Agrarian Unrest', in *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 353-83.
- Calvert, H., 1922, *The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab: Being Some Studies in Punjab Rural Economics*, Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press.
- Cheema, A., H. Javid and F. Naseer, 2013, 'Dynastic Politics in Punjab: Facts, Myths and Their Implications', Working Paper No. 01-13, Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives, Pakistan.
- Cheema, A., Shandana K. Mohmand and M. Patnam, 2009, 'Colonial Proprietary Elites and Institutions: The Persistence of De Facto Political Dominance', *Center for Economic Research Pakistan Working Paper Series*, Center for Economic Research, Pakistan.
- Daechsel, M., 2006, *The Politics of Self-Expression: The Urdu Middle-Class Milieu in Mid-Twentieth Century India and Pakistan*, London: Routledge.
- Dewey, C., 1991, 'The Influence of Sir Henry Maine on Agrarian Policy in India', in Alan Diamond (ed.), *The Victorian Achievement of Sir Henry Maine: A Centennial Reappraisal*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 353-75.
- Diamond, L.J., 2000, 'Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 91-106.
- Gilmartin, D., 1988, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan*, London: I.B. Taurus and Co. Ltd.
- , 1994, 'Scientific Empire and Imperial Science: Colonialism and Irrigation Technology in the Indus Basin', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 1127-49.
- , 2004, 'Migration and Modernity: The State, the Punjabi Village, and the Settling of the Canal Colonies', in Ian Talbot and Shinder Thandi (eds.), *People on the Move: Punjabi Colonial and Post-Colonial Migration*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-20.
- Glover, William J., 2005, 'Objects, Models, and Exemplary Works: Educating Sentiment in Colonial India', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 539-66.
- Government of Punjab, *Annual Report on the Chenab Colony*, 1903.
- , *Annual Report on the Chenab Colony*, 1904.
- , *Annual Report on the Lower Chenab Colony*, 1914.
- , *Memorandum on the Moral and Material Progress of the Punjab 1901-2 to 1911-12*, Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press.
- , Proceedings of the Council of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Punjab Government Legislative Department, 7th October 1901.

- , Proceedings of the Punjab Revenue and Agriculture Department, April 1900, Ref #4, Lahore.
- , Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the Punjab for the Agricultural Year ending 30th September 1913.
- , Report on the Punjab Colonies for the Year ending 30th September 1914.
- , *Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement*, 1916.
- , Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the Punjab for the Agricultural Year ending 30th September 1917.
- , Report on the Punjab Colonies for the Year ending 30th September 1921.
- , Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the Punjab for the Year ending 30th September 1921.
- , Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the Punjab for the Agricultural Year ending 30th September 1928.
- , Report on the Operations of the Department of Land Records and Agriculture, Punjab, 1899-1900.
- Hambly, G.R.G., 1964, 'Richard Temple and the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868', *The English Historical Review*, vol. 79, no. 310, pp. 47-66.
- Hamid, N., 1982, 'Dispossession and Differentiation of the Peasantry in the Punjab During Colonial Rule', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, vol. 10, pp. 52-72.
- Haqqani, H., 2016, *Between Mosque and Military* (2nd Edition), New Delhi: Penguin Books.
- Husain, J., 2016, *Pakistan and a World in Disorder: A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Javid, H., 2011, 'Class, Power and Patronage: Landowners and Politics in Punjab', in *History and Anthropology*, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 337-69
- , 2015, 'Elections, Bureaucracy, and the Law: The Reproduction of Landed Power in Post-Colonial Punjab', in Roger Long, Ian Talbot, Gurharpal Singh, and Yunus Samad (eds.), *Beyond Islam and Security: State and Nation-Building in Pakistan*, London: Routledge, pp. 35-59.
- Kerr, I., 2007, 'British Rule, Technological Change, and the Revolution in Transportation and Communication: Punjab in the Late-Nineteenth Century', in Tony Ballantyne, (ed.), *Textures of the Sikh Past: New Historical Perspectives*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 155-82.
- Khan, A. R., 1935, 'Punjab Village Surveys no. 8: An Economic Survey of Bhambu Sandila, a Village in the Muzaffargarh District of the Punjab', Board of Economic Inquiry, Government of Punjab.
- Lefebvre, H., 1991, *The Production of Space*, tr. David Nicholson-Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2009a, 'Reflections on the Politics of Space', in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds.), *State, Space, World: Selected Essays*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 167-84.
- , 2009b, 'Space and Mode of Production', in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds.), *State, Space, World: Selected Essays*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 210-22.
- , 2009c, 'Space and the State', in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds.), *State, Space, World: Selected Essays*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 223-53.
- Major, A., 1991, 'The Punjab Chieftains and the Transition from Sikh to British Rule', in Donald A. Low (ed.), *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan*, London: Macmillan, pp. 53-85.

- , 1999, 'State and Criminal Tribes in Colonial Punjab: Surveillance, Control and Reclamation of the "Dangerous Classes"', in *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 33, no. 33, pp. 657-88.
- Martin, N., 2014, *Politics, Landlords, and Islam in Pakistan*, London: Routledge.
- Metcalf, Thomas R., 1962, 'The Struggle Over Land Tenure in India, 1860-1868', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 295-307.
- Mishra, Satish C., 1982, 'Commercialisation, Peasant Differentiation and Merchant Capital in Late Nineteenth-Century Bombay and Punjab', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 3-51.
- Mohmand, Shandana K., 2014, 'Losing the Connection: Party-Voter Linkages in Pakistan', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 7-31.
- Mukherjee, M., 2005, *Colonializing Agriculture: The Myth of Punjabi Exceptionalism*, Delhi: Sage.
- Nazir, P., 2000, 'Origins of Debt, Mortgage and Alienation of Land in Early Modern Punjab', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 55-91.
- Nelson, Matthew J., 2011, *In the Shadow of Shari'ah: Islam, Islamic Law, and Democracy in Pakistan*, London: C. Hurst & Co.
- Pasha, Mustapha K., 1998, *Colonial Political Economy: Recruitment and Underdevelopment in the Punjab*, Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Penner, P., 1986, *The Patronage Bureaucracy in North India: The Robert M. Bird and James Thomason School 1820-1870*, Delhi: Chanakya Publications.
- Qadeer, Mohammad A., 2000, 'Ruralopolises: The Spatial Organisation and Residential Land Economy of High-Density Rural Regions in South Asia', in *Urban Studies*, vol. 37, no. 9, pp. 1583-1603.
- Raulet, Harry M., 1971, 'The Historical Context of Pakistan's Rural Economy', in Hamza Alavi, Peter J. Bertocci and Robert D. Stevens (eds.), *Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan*, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, pp. 198-213.
- Rehman, T., 2012, *The Class Structure of Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Singh, R., 1932, 'Punjab Village Surveys no. 4: An Economic Survey of Kala Gaddi Thamman (Chak 73 G.B.), a Village in the Lyallpur District of the Punjab', Board of Economic Inquiry, Government of Punjab.
- Soja, Edward W., 1980, 'The Socio-Spatial Dialectic', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, vol. 70, no. 2, pp. 207-25.
- Stokes, E., 1980, 'Bureaucracy and Ideology: Britain and India in the Nineteenth Century', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, vol. 20, pp. 131-56.
- Talbot, I., 1980, 'The 1946 Punjab Elections', *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 65-91.
- , 1988, *The Punjab Under the Raj: 1849-1947*, Riverdale: The Riverdale Company.
- Trevaskis, Hugh K., 1928, *The Land of the Five Rivers: An Economic History of the Punjab From the Earliest Times to the Year of Grace 1890*, London: Oxford University Press.
- Van Den Dungen, P.H.M., 1972, *The Punjab Tradition*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.